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The Perceived Effectiveness of the
Officer Certification Requirement
under Sarbanes-Oxley
T. Jean Engebretson' and Heidi Hylton Meier'
IFairnlOnt State University
'Cleveland State University

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 brought about sweeping
changes that were meant to improve corporate reporting in the
United States and to restore investor confidence following
some of the largest business failures in US history. This study
examines one requirement of this legislation, the certification
of the financial statements by the Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) by surveying
stakeholder constituent groups to determine whether this new
requirement is effective in accomplishing the goals established
by Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). This is accomplished by using Cameron's strategic
constituencies model to test seven research questions
developed from the current literature which provides various
points of view regarding the appropriateness of the CEO/CFO
certification. Based on the results of these tests, we see that
there are significant differences among the perceptions of the
constituent groups as to the effectiveness of this requirement.

Key words: Accounting, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Section 302, CEO
certification, CFO certification, audit, internal control, investor
confidence, audit quality, corporate governance

SUMMARY
A major goal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was
to improve corporate reporting in the United States
so as to restore investor confidence and stabilize
the credit markets following major business
failures in the US. One of the requirements of this
law was to make officers more accountable through
the certification of the financial statements by the
Correspondence to: Heidi Hylton Meier, Professor of
Accounting, Department of Accounting, Cleveland State
University, 1860 East 18th Street, Cleveland, Ohio, USA. Email:
h.meier®csuohio.edu

Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief
Financial Officer (CFO). Although the literature
provided some discussion of this new requirement,
there had been very little empirical evidence
regarding the effectiveness of this new rule. This
study attempts to fill that void and examines the
effectiveness of this requirement by using a
questionnaire to survey stakeholder groups
(accounting educators, certified public accountants,
internal auditors, bankers, and certified financial
analysts) to determine how well each of these
groups felt that this requirement would be in
improving the quality of corporate reporting.
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After a thorough examination of the current
literature and Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, seven research questions were developed
and were tested using Cameron's strategic
constituencies model in which we determined
whether there were any differences among the
perceptions of the constituent groups as to the
effectiveness of this requirement. In conclusion,
bankers differed with the other constituent groups
in that they were more negative on most of their
views, especially concerning the purpose of the
requirement and specifically, that they have little
confidence that the certification requirement will
improve corporate reporting. In contrast,
accounting educators were much more positive
in their views, and in general believe that people
and society can be changed through laws and
regulation.

INTRODUCTION
As a result of one of the most notorious fraud
schemes in recent memory, Enron Corporation
filed for bankruptcy in early December 2001.
Not surprisingly, the corporation's collapse was
followed by several years of Congressional
investigation and legal prosecution. During one
such investigation, Jeffrey Skilling, a past Enron
CEO, tes tified before the House Energy and
Commerce Committee. During this testimony, Mr
Skilling stated that 'he was unaware of any
accounting practices designed to hide debt or
make the company look more solvent than it really
was' ('Lay may testify', 2002). Naturally, it is
difficult to believe that the CEO of a major
corporation could be that clueless about the
operation of his own company; so unknowing, in
fact, that 'others' could have perpetrated one of
the largest contemporary fraud schemes right
under his very nose while he remained completely
unaware of it.
While it is not surprising that an individual
accused of fraud or embezzlement would be less
than forthcoming regarding their culpability in a
fraud scheme, it is remarkable that so many of
these individuals ultimately choose to blame the
accountant while also claiming that they are
unwitting victims themselves. Even though the
'I-am-not-an-accountant-so-I-am-not-responsible'
defense may not be particularly credible, it has
been specifically addressed in the reforms set forth
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The Act requires

the CEO and CFO to certify that financial results
are not false or misleading. Specifically, the
principal executive and financial officers must
'certify' each annual and quarterly report that is
filed under the Act that:
1. ll1ey have reviewed the report;
2. The report does not contain any material false
statements or any material omissions of fact
that would make it misleading, given their
personal knowledge of the report; and
3. The financial information included in the
report presents fairly, in all material respects,
the financial position and results of operations
of the company, given their personal
knowledge of the company's performance.
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Section 302, p. 37)
In addition to the report certification, the officers
must also attest to the condition of the system of
internal controls. Specifically, the CEO and CFO
must assert that:
1. It is their responsibility to design and maintain

the internal control system so that it will
generate important information that will be
communicated to the appropriate corporate
officer for action;
2. They have evaluated said internal control
system for effectiveness within 90 days of the
financial reporti and

3. They have issued a report regarding their
conclusions concerning the effectiveness of the
internal control system. The report must also
include any Significant manges to that system
after the evaluation was made. (Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Section 302, p. 37)
Finally, the CEO and CFO must certify that they
have clisclosed to the auditor and the audit
committee of the board of directors all Significant
deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
internal control structure and any fraud cases
involving employees who are key components in
the internal control system (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Section 302, p. 37).

LITERATURE REVIEW
There has been a considerable amount published
about the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Some authors have
discussed the reasons for the legislation (Rezaee,
2005) and others have provided practical advice on
the implementation of the law. Several authors
have raised questions regarding whether new laws
and regulations can achieve what prior laws and
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regulations could not (Ronen & Berman, 2004;
Romano, 2005). While many of these authors are
quite skeptical (Ribstein, 2002; Heeren & Rieckers,
2003) about how successful Sarbanes-Oxley will be
in addressing the issues that Congress had hoped
to resolve, some are optimistic that the financial
reporting process will be improved (Geiger &
Taylor, 2003; Klein, 2003).
Although there has been much written about the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, most of this work has been
presented without empirical results. However,
there are a few research studies to note. Kinney
et al. (2004) conducted a study regarding the
services that are prohibited by the Act. The authors
contended that there was no empirical justification
by Congress or the SEC to prove that such services
impair audit quality and they provide empirical
evidence on 289 firms that restated their financial
statements to determine any effects of proViding
non-audit services. They concluded that
prohibiting financial services design but allowing
tax services may improve the quality of financial
reporting.
Nagy and Cenker (2007) surveyed Chief Audit
Executives from 17 publicly held Northeast Ohio
companies to determine the effect of Section 404
compliance on the internal audit profession. Their
results showed that short-term benefits include
improved job security, increased compensation,

and greater visibility within the organization.
However, the authors question whether these
short-run benefits will have long-term costs by
turning these departments into compliance units
that require less professional judgment and
expertise, concluding that perhaps organizations
should form compliance groups to handle these
new requirements so that internal auditors can

resume their activities that add value and improve
their organization's operations. Bryan (2009) and
Bryan et al. (2008) interviewed high ranking
corporate managers and analyzed their team
approach to comply with Section 404 requirements
of Sarbanes-Oxley and noted differences in their
approaches.
The results of the current study, while
exploratory in nature, provide additional empirical
evidence regarding the effectiveness of Sarbanes
Oxley by examining one part of the law, the
certifications that are required by the CEOs and
CFOs. By seeking the views of several different
stakeholders, we attempt to determine whether
this additional measure is perceived to enhance the
reporting process.

RESEARCH STUDY
As

a corporate governance mechanism, it
appears that the purpose of the CEO certification

requirement

is

to

make

corporate

officers

personally responSible for the financial information
that is disseminated about their company. Gone are
the days when the corporate officer can disavow
any knowledge of wrongdoing and blame it solely
on the accountant. Now, officers are required to be
knowledgeable about internal control procedures
and material weaknesses as well as accounting
principles and professional codes of conduct.
Much has been written in the financial press
concerning the advantages and disadvantages of
the certification requirement. Some authors state
that the requirement was necessary in order to

give investors the requisite level of comfort to
invest in the market after the collapse of Enron
(Marden et aI., 2003; Fornelli, 2007). Others believe
that it will help corporations become more control
conscious as well as aiding in the risk
identification process (McConnell & Banks, 2003;
Henry, 2007). On the other hand, the process
involved with certification will be arduous and

time consuming and it is quite possible that the
cost of the certification could outweigh its benefits
(McConnell & Banks, 2003; Grady, 2007; Scannell,
2007; Wilcox, 2007). Even if executive officers
manage to complete the procedures necessary for
certification, it may be impossible for them to
attest to the information required by the Act. The
officer may be incapable of actually knowing that
there are no improprieties at some distant
operations (Avellanet, 2003).
It seems that there are various points of view
regarding the appropriateness of the CEO/CFO
certification requirement to improve corporate
governance in US companies. To measure
effectiveness, a study based on a survey of the Act's
constituents was conducted to determine the level
of agreement on the following set of research
questions which were derived from a review of
prior literature:
RQl: The constituent groups will agree that

the CEO / CFO certification requirement gives
investors a greater sense of comfort follOWing the
Enron collapse.
RQ2: The constituent groups will agree that

the CEO / CFO certification requirement helps
corporations become better at identifying risks
and controlling operations.
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RQ3: The constituent groups will agree that the
CEOjCFO certification requirement will ensure
that no false or misleading financial statements
will be issued by corporations.
RQ4: The constituent groups will agree that
the CEO j CFO certification requirement was
unnecessary because the same statements are
made to the auditor in
representation letter.

the management

RQ5: The constituent groups will agree that the
costs of the CEOjCFO certification requirement
will outweigh its benefits.
RQ6: The constituent groups will agree that the
CEOs and CFOs cannot know what is happening
at all their operations, especially in large,
multinational companies.
RQ7: TI1e constituent groups will agree that the
CEOjCFO certification requirement will induce
CEOs and CFOs to create new methods to shield
their personal assets from potential liability.
The following discussion proVides an overview
of how the literature was used in the development
of these research questions. The first research
question was derived based on the premise that
there is some sentin1ent that the Act was solely a
political gesture to make investors feel better
(Marden et al., 2003). Therefore, this question is
used to determine whether or not the CEOjCFO
certification indeed gives investors a greater sense
of comfort after the Enron disaster. The second
question is based on the belief that the officer
certification requirement will, in fact, help publicly
traded corporations identify risks and become
more control conscious (McConnell & Banks, 2003).
Most importantly, from the Act itself, it is stated that
the overall purpose is to improve the transparency
and accuracy of corporate reporting. Hence, in

RQ3, the query is whether the CEOjCFO
certification requirement would ensure that the
financial report was accurate.

Some authors stated that the CEOjCFO
certification was unnecessary due to the assertions
already made in the representation letter (Marden
et aI., 2003) or due to its excessive cost in both
time and money (McConnell & Banks, 2003). The
fourth research question was based on these
studies as was RQ5, focusing on the cost of
certification and whether it would outweigh its
benefits given the time-consuming effort required
to generate it.

Finally, the last two research questions dealt with
the more pragmatic issues of the certification
requirement Some authors have stated that it will
be in1possible to be certain that the information
generated in distant locations is accurate
(Avellanet, 2003). Therefore, the sixth research
question asks if it is even possible for the CEO j
CFO to know if the information is accurate,
especially the information generated at distant
operations. The last question, RQ7, concerns the all
too human desire of officers to protect themselves.
The certification requirement makes executives
personally liable for false information included in
the report. As a result, officers may need to devise
methods that can be used to shield their personal
assets in the event malfeasance is discovered in the
report (Marden et aI., 2003) and this question
focuses on the effect the certification requirement
will have on a company's officials.

Measuring effectiveness
There are several models available to measure
effectiveness. However, each one struggles with
the problem of defining 'effectiveness' as 'effective'
means different things to different people at
different times. Researchers always want to
develop a comprehensive list of indicators or
predictors that can be applied to any situation to
measure the effectiveness of an organization or
system. It is possible that attempting to create such
a comprehensive list of effectiveness predictors is a
futile endeavor. According to Cameron, 'consensus
regarding the best, or sufficient, set of indicators of
effectiveness is impossible to obtain. Criteria are
based on the values and preferences of individuals
and no specifiable construct boundaries exist'
(Cameron, 1986, p. 541). A model specifically based
on this notion that each individual measures
effectiveness differently is known as the strategic
constituencies model. In this model, effectiveness
is determined by how well 'all strategic
constituencies are at least minimally satisfied'
(Cameron, 1986, p. 542). There are several
variations of this model (e.g., relativism, power,
social justice, evolutionary, etc.). Yet, each variation
of the model has a core component that states
effectiveness is evaluated by how well the interests
of various constituencies have been satisfied. Any
individual or groups of individuals with a stake in
the organization or system is considered to be a
constituent of the system (Gibson et aI., 1997).
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This model has been useful in evaluating
effectiveness in those cases where there are few
concrete or measurable goals, objectives, or outputs
(see Alam et al., 2000; Engebretson, 2006).

The social test [is] to be the most suitable for
those units that cannot be measured with
absolute empirical standards due to ... the lack
of clear measurable outputs. The effectiveness of
these units can be assessed meaningfully only by
the opinion of some referent groups. (Tsui, 1990,
p.459)
Consequently, the constituencies model seems
especially appropriate for measuring the
effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its
components. The Act is a broad legislative measure
with a stated purpose of improving audit quality,
financial reporting quality, and corporate
governance procedures. As such, it has impacted
many diverse groups in the financial reporting
process including investors, creditors, certified
public accountants (CPAs), public accounting
firms, audit committees, managers, officers, and
directors of publicly traded companies. One can
assume that each different constituency will
have been impacted differently by the Act. If
so, then each constituent group would view
the effectiveness of the Act differently based on the
personal experience of the constituents with the
provisions of the Act and the execution of those
provisions.

A key postulate of the multiple constituency
model is that the organization is usually not able
to satisfy the interests of different constituencies
Simultaneously. . . . In other words, the
predictors of effectiveness, strategic or
environmental, may vary with different
constituencies. (Tsui, 1989, p. 188)

number of fraudulent financial statements
published before the passage of the officer
certification requirement to the number published
after
the
requirement
became
enacted.
Unfortunately, publicly traded companies do not
advertise that they are publishing fraudulent
financial statements. It is unlikely that any
company would openly admit to such activity in a
researcher's study. Misstatements can occur for
years before they are detected by the financial
community. As a result, a more direct measurement

of effectiveness seems unavailable at this time and
instead, this research study will use the multiple
constituencies model to evaluate the effectiveness
of the CEO / CFO certification requirement as
expressed by the constituent groups impacted by
the Act.

Constituent groups defined
This study will examine whether various
stakeholder groups are in agreement regarding
their belief about the effectiveness of the CEO/
CFO certification requirement to improve
corporate governance. The results of the study will
greatly depend upon the constituent groups that
are identified and included in the research study.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a sweeping reform
package with stated designs on improving
corporate reporting in the US. It is imperative
to consider the views of public accountants and
corporate management, who are the two
constituent groups most affected by this legislation.
In addition, the Act has a stated goal of protecting
the investing public, and therefore, users of
financial statements are also included in the study.
Consequently, the constituent groups to be
included in fue study are accountants, corporate
management, and financial statement users.

If each different constituent group can be expected

to have a different opinion of the effectiveness of
the certification requirement, the agreement of
different constituencies on the evaluation of the
effectiveness of the certification requirement
would provide some support for the effectiveness
of the certification requirement in improving
corporate governance procedures in the US.
It should be noted, however, that this study will
only assess one measurement of tl1e effectiveness
construct. It is not, nor does it purport to be, the
only or even the best measure of effectiveness.
In fact, one of the best measurements of the
effectiveness of the Act would be to compare the

Instrument design
The research instrument is a survey that was
developed through an examination of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, auclit quality literature, and
critiques of the Act in the financial press. In
addition to the seven research questions that were
previously discussed, standard demographic data
were requested from each participant as well as an
evaluation of fueir level of knowledge about the
Act. For purposes of control, a respondent was
asked to rate his or her familiarity with the Act. As
the results of the survey would be meaningless if
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Table 1: Response rate

Total responses
Less: unusable responses
Usable responses
Final response rate

Bankers

CFAs

CPAs

Educators

Internal
auditors

Total

53
(2)
51
17.59%

48
(1)
47
13.78%

65
(5)
60
21.13%

66
(4)
62
21.38%

90
(2)
88
30.34%

322
(14)
308
20.60%

the respondent has no knowledge of the Act, those
surveys were excluded from the data analysis if the
participant stated that he or she was unfamiliar
with the Act.
As the survey questions used in this paper were
developed expressly for this research study, the
validity of the survey questions to actually measure
the construct under study was first established. The
survey questions were first evaluated for content
by CPA practitioners. The results of this pre-test
were used to revise, format, and condense
the survey instrument. A pilot study of the
formatted questionnaire was then conducted of
CPA practitioners, bankers, and internal auditors.

Revisions to the survey instrument were again
made as a result of the feedback from the pilot
study.

Survey implementation and response rate

The response for this survey is presented in
Table 1. A total of 322 surveys were returned. Of
those, 14 were not useful for data analYSiS,
primarily due to missing data, resulting in a
response rate of almost 21 %. In addition, a test for
non-response bias was conducted on the survey
data. The 308 usable responses from the survey
were divided into two groups: early responders
and late responders. The responses of the late
responders are assumed to be similar to those of
non-respondents for this survey (Armstrong &
Overton, 1977). A test of means was conducted on
the variables from the survey questions of
relevance to this paper to determine any significant
differences in the means of the two groups. No
significant differences were found in any of the
variables and, consequently, this would suggest
that there is not a significant level of non-response
bias in the sample.

The constituent groups to be included in the study
are

accountants, corporate management, and
financial statement users. The accountant
constituent group was represented by CPAs and

accounting educators. The financial statement user

constituent group was represented by chartered
financial analysts (CFAs) representing the investor
category of financial statement users and bankers
representing creditors. Finally, the corporate
management group was represented by internal
auditors.

A total of 1,600 surveys were administered by
mail to the stakeholder groups listed above. Steps
were taken to improve the response rate of the
survey including a personalized cover letter, a
reminder postcard, and a second request mailing.
In addition, the survey instrument itself was
designed to appear short and easy to complete. A
total of 63 surveys were marked 'return to sender'
and 42 surveys were returned by individuals who
no longer worked in the relevant profeSSion, so the
final survey consisted of a total of 1,495 potential
research subjects.

RESULTS

Demographics
Demographic data was requested of each
respondent, including age, gender, education level,
professional credentials, profeSSion, and years
employed in the profeSSion. The information for
each constituent group appears in Table 2. Overall,
nearly 80 percent (243) of the individuals
responding to the survey were male and 76 percent
(234) of the respondents were between the ages
of 40 and 60. Individually, it would appear
that bankers and CFAs represent the youngest
constituents (22 percent and 25 percent under 39
years old, respectively). Of the total respondents,
approXimately 40 percent (122) had a bachelor's
degree and 41 percent (126) had a master's degree.
Most of the survey participants have a CPA license
(69 percent or 202 respondents).
Other information was requested regarding
the respondent's employer characteristics. These
included the employer's primary industry and total
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Table 2: Demographic information
Bankers
(n = 51)

CFAs

CPAs

(n = 47)

(n = 60)

Educators
(n = 62)

1ntenIaI

auditors
(n =88)

Gender

Male
Female
Age
<30 yrs
30-39 yrs
40-49 yrs
50-59 yrs
>60 yrs

39 (76%)
12 (24%)

41 (87%)
6 (13%)

47 (78%)
13 (22%)

39 (63%)
23 (37%)

77 (88%)
11 (12%)

1 (2%)
16 (31 %)
17 (33%)
7 (14%)

3 (6%)
9 (19%)
15 (32%)
12 (26%)
8 (17%)

1 (2%)
0(0%)
21 (35%)
27 (45%)
11 (18%)

3
5
18
27
9

1
4
43
38
2

34 (66%)
10 (20%)
7 (14%)

10 (21 %)
34 (73%)
3 (6%)

37 (62%)
20 (33%)
3 (5%)

0(0%)
17 (27%)
45 (73%)

41 (47%)
45 (51%)
2 (2%)

5
15
21
10

10 (21 %)
17 (36%)
12 (26%)
8 (17%)

3
12
27
18

18
25
13
6

14
38
29
7

10 (20%)

(5%)
(8%)
(29%)
(44%)
(14%)

(1%)
(5%)
(49%)
(43%)
(2%)

Education

Bachelor's
Master's

Other
Years in the profession
<10 yrs
10-20 yrs
21-30 yrs
>30 yrs

(10%)
(29%)
(41 %)
(20%)

number of people employed. The primary
Industries reported by participants Included
colleges/universities (19 percent), banking (19
percent), public accounting (18 percent), and
financial services consulting (14 percent). Most of
the employers were either small businesses with
less than 100 employees (34 percent) or large
employers with more than 1,000 employees (31
percent).

Pro-certification questions
Three questions in the survey instrument were
investigating the perceptions of the more positive
aspects of the CEO/CFO certification requirement.
Specifically, the survey asked participants if the
requirement would give investors a greater sense

of comfort following the Enron collapse, if it would
improve the entity's risk identification process and
control consciousness, and if the requirement
would ensure that the report does not contain any
material untrue statement or omission of fact.
Responses were recorded on a five-pOint
Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly agree, 5 = Strongly
disagree).
Results were evaluated using the one-way or
Single factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the
responses for each of the research questions.
ANOVA is a commonly used procedure for testing
the equality of the means for more than two

(5%)
(20%)
(45%)
(30%)

(29%)
(40%)
(21%)
(10%)

(16%)
(43%)
(33%)
(8%)

populations. The equality of means was tested by
comparing two estimates of the variance common
to the separate populations (variance between the
samples and variance within the samples) (Triola,
2007). It is an appropriate statistical test for this
type of analysis because it: (i) examlnes differences
In the sample average for more than one group; (ii)
does not require the samples to be of equal size;
and (iii) uses samples that are simple random
samples that are Independent of one another and
are categorized In only one way (Triola, 2007)
(constituent groups).
FolloWing the ANOVA, the calculation of a
significant F-test was used to Indicate if a
statistical difference In the means exists. However,
it does not identify which means are different,
and In order to identify which groups have
different means, additional testing is required.
Although there are several methods available,
the Scheffe test was chosen for this study. The
Scheffe test is a post-hoc method for adjusting
Significance levels In ANOVA and is considered
to be a conservative' test, tending to err on
the side of underestimating significance (Vogt,
1993, p. 204). It is a test that is used often, is
known to work well In cases with unequal cell
sizes, and will provide specific information on
which means are significantly different from each
other. These results are presented In the
discussion below.
I
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Research question 1: Investor comfort
Many critics of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have stated
that its sole purpose was to restore investor
confidence in the market without any substantive
improvements in the governance of corporations.
One of the survey questions specifically asked if the
CEO and CFO certification will give investors a
greater sense of comfort following the Enron
collapse. A univariate ANOVA was conducted by
constituent groups. The ANOVA was significant
with FI. 303 (0.05) = 8.54, P< 0.001. Post-hoc analysis
using the Scheffe Test revealed significant mean
differences. Bankers had higher mean scores
compared to internal auditors, CFAs, and
accounting educators. In addition, CPAs had
higher mean scores compared to educators. Lower
scores indicate agreement with the statement that
the certification requirement would give jittery
investors a greater sense of comfort in unstable
financial times. The means and standard deviations
for RQ1 are presented in Table 3.

The first research question revealed that there
were significant mean differences by the creditor
and the accountant constituent groups. Bankers
had significantly higher mean scores than internal
auditors, CPAs, and educators. One possibility for
these results is that bankers believe that the
purpose of the legislation was not merely to coddle
jittery investors and that the certification
requirement will bolster the credibility and
truthfulness of the financial statements that they
use every day. Another possible explanation could
indicate that bankers believe the purpose of the
certification requirement was to calm investors but

that it may not be completely effective in doing so.
Likewise, CPAs also had significantly higher
mean scores than educators. While both groups
were considered the accountant constituent,
accountants in public practice and accountants in
education have a very different perspective. Public
practice involves the practical application of
accounting pronouncements while accounting
education can be more theoretical. It is not

Table 3: Means and standard deviations for RQI-RQ7
Research question

Bankers

CFAs

CPAs

Educators

11ltenlal

auditors
RQl: Investor comfort
Means

SD
II

RQ2: Control consciousness
Means

SD
II

3.37
1.04
51.00

2.55
1.11
47.00

2.88
1.18
60.00

2.27
0.94
62.00

2.54
1.08
88.00

2.96
0.94
51.00

2.53
0.95
47.00

2.91
1.15
60.00

2.37
1.10
62.00

2.27
1.03
88.00

3.70
1.10
51.00

3.55
1.05
47.00

3.95
0.99
60.00

3.90
1.01
62.00

3.51
1.12
88.00

2.61
1.18
51.00

3.36
1.13
47.00

3.38
1.24
60.00

3.69
1.12
62.00

3.81
1.22
88.00

2.34
1.04
50.00

3.04
1.19
46.00

3.31
1.15
60.00

3.50
1.18
62.00

3.44
1.11
88.00

2.31
1.14
50.00

2.48
1.10
46.00

2.50
1.19
60.00

2.56
1.08
62.00

2.84
1.20
88.00

1.86
0.80
50.00

1.89
0.66
47.00

2.25
0.86
60.00

2.43
0.93
62.00

2.20
0.86
88.00

RQ3: Report accuracy
Means

SD
11

RQ4: Management representation letter
Means

SD
11

RQ5: Costibenefit
Means

SD
II

RQ6: Unable to know
Means

SD
II

RQ7: Executive personal liability
Means

SD
II
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surprising that CPAs may be more skeptical of the
effectiveness of the Act than were educators. As
with the banking constituents, it is possible that
CPAs believe that the Act's underlying purpose was
more substantive than has been portrayed in the
financial press. It is also possible that CPAs believe
that the Act will give management the impetus to
improve the quality and transparency of their
corporate financial reporting. On the other hand, it
could also indicate that CPAs believe that the
purpose of the Act was, in fact, to soothe nervous
investors but that this goal may not be achieved
through the certification requirement. For both the
banking and CPA constituent groups, further
research needs to be conducted to determine the
specific reasons for these constituent groups'
dissatisfaction with the certification requirement.

different mean scores than internal auditors and
educators and CPAs had higher mean scores than

Research question 2: Control consciousness

either redundant or ineffective.
Furthermore, CPAs appear more skeptical than
internal auditors. The results of this test may be a
result of the level of independence that the external
auditor has had as opposed to the internal auditor
as they are still employees of the corporation. The
external auditor has always had more leverage
where the audit client is concerned, and now
Sarbanes-Oxley finally gives internal auditors the
ability to require that the company enforce the
sound internal control procedures that the internal
auditor has been 'suggesting' for decades. As such,
it would not be surprising that internal auditors
would value the Act's influence on risk analysis and
control consciousness more than the external CPA
would.

internal auditors.
It appears that bankers are skeptical concerning
the certification's impact on the company's risk

analysis process. Perhaps the results are due to
the nature of the banking industry, in that
bankers use financial statements to evaluate the
creditworthiness of a particular business. During
the course of that credit evaluation, bankers, like
management, also evaluate the potential risks that
a company may face in order to determine the risk
of insolvency by the potential debtor. Perhaps
bankers have already concluded that some
companies are very good at risk analysis while
others are not; this risk analysis process is a part of

everyday business activities in a global market.
Consequently, the certification requirement, in
regard to risk analysis and control consciousness, is

Proponents of the Act argue that through the
process of implementing the provisions of the
Act, corporations will become better at identifying
risks. It would also make the corporations
more internal control conscious. One question in
the survey asked the constituent groups if
the CEO / CFO certification would improve the
entity's risk identification process and enhance
control consciousness throughout the organization.
A univariate ANOVA was conducted by
constituent groups. The ANOVA was significant
with F.1. 303 (0.05) = 5.80, P < 0.001. Post-hoc analysis
using the Scheffe Test revealed significant mean
differences. Bankers had higher mean scores than
internal auditors and accounting educators. In
addition, CPAs had higher mean scores than
internal auditors. Lower mean scores indicate
agreement with the statement that the Act will
improve internal control consciousness and the risk

identification process. The means and standard
deviations for RQ2 are presented in Table 3.
The second research question concentrated on
the idea that the Act would make the management
of a corporation more control conscious.
Management would become better at identifying
the risks that threaten the existence and prosperity
of the organization. In so doing, management could
take the appropriate steps to mitigate or even
eliminate some of these risks. However, RQ2
also revealed that bankers and CPAs once again
had significantly different views from the other
constituent groups. Bankers had significantly

Research question 3: Report accuracy
The stated purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 is to promote the accuracy and transparency
of financial reports in the US. Some argue that
making executive officers personally responsible
for the corporation's reports will improve the
accuracy and transparency of such reports. To that
end, one question in the survey asked constituent
groups if the CEO and CFO certification will
ensure that the report does not contain any untrue
statement or material fact or any omission of
material fact. A univariate ANOVA was conducted
by constituent groups. The ANOVA was not
Significant with F.1. 303 (0.05) = 2.28, P < 0.060, and
post-hoc tests revealed no significant mean
differences between constituent groups. Higher
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mean scores indicate disagreement with the survey

question. The means and standard deviations for
RQ3 are presented in Table 3.
The third research question dealt with the ability
of the Act to eliminate materially misstated financial
statements. Participants were asked if the CEO /
CFO certification requirement would ensure that
no materially misstated financial statements would
be issued. RQ3 was not supported as all five
constituent groups disagreed with the idea that the
certification requirement would guarantee that the
financial statements are accurate. It seems apparent
in the results of the survey that all parties involved
with the financial statements realize or expect some
misstated financial statements to 'slip through the
cracks.' Regulation of financial markets had been
in place for decades, yet Enron and Worldcom
still occurred. Mere legislation is unable to cure the
human race of greed and as such, Enron-like cases
will occur again in the future. In this case, more
legislation is unlikely to succeed where past
legislation has failed. Certain individuals will
choose to take illegal actions in spite of the
consequences. If criminal prosecution is not

already a deterrent to illegal action, adding a
certification requirement is unlikely to change the
results. The results of this survey appear to support
this argument.

Anti-certification questions
Four questions in the survey instrument
investigated the more negative aspects of the
executive
officer
certification
requirement.
Specifically, the questions asked if the requirement
was tuUl€cessary due to the management letter; if
the costs outweigh the benefits; if the officers are
incapable of knowing whether the information is
accurate; and if the requirement will lead to various
attempts by officers to shield personal assets from
exposure to lawsuits. Responses were recorded on
a five-point Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly agree,
5 = Strongly disagree).

Research question 4: Management
representation letter
Many critics of the Act felt that the provisions of
the Act were unnecessary. It was already a crime
to issue false financial statements, yet numerous

fraudulent financial statements were issued
anyway. As with the certification requirement,
management already made these representations to

the company's auditor making certification of the
report unnecessary and redundant. One question
in the survey asked constituent groups if
certification is unnecessary because the officers
already provide assurances to the auditor in the
management representation letter. A univariate
ANOVA was conducted by constituent groups. The
ANOVA was significant with Fl. 303 (0.05) = 9.17,
P < 0.001. Post-hoc analysis using the Scheffe Test
revealed significant mean differences. Internal
auditors, CFAs, CPAs, and educators all had higher
mean scores than bankers. Lower mean scores
indicate agreement with the statement that the
management representation letter was sufficient.
The means and standard deviations for RQ4 are
presented in Table 3.
Respondents were asked if the certification
requirement was unnecessary given the fact that
management was already required to sign a
representation letter for the external auditor. Such
representation letters include statements that
management has clisclosed all information
relevant to the audit of the financial statements to
the auditor during the course of the audit. All
constituent groups except bankers disagreed with
the idea that the certification requirement was
unnecessary because management has already
Signed the management representation letter to
the auditor. Bankers appear to believe that the
management representation letter is enough. This
response is consistent with the results of the
previous research question. In the previous
results, bankers had less confidence in the Act's
ability to restore confidence in the market, to help
the risk analysis process, or to improve the
accuracy of the financial statements. In this case,
the results suggest that bankers believe that the
certification requirement adds little additional
credibility to the financial statements beyond what
was already gained through the management
representation letter. It does not necessarily
indicate that bankers have any confidence in the
management representation letter to the auditor. It
just inclicates that they are no more confident in
the financial statements after the certification
requirement than they were when management
was just signing a representation letter for the
auditor. In fact, it is entirely possible that bankers
were dissatisfied with the system then and are
still dissatisfied with the system now. The
certification requirement has done little to
increase their confidence in the financial reporting
process.
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Research question 5: Costlbenefit

however, relate to educators. Educators really have

As many executive officers come
management or marketing positions
f

from
it is

conceivable that they may not possess the requisite
knowledge base to actually certify the reports as
required by the Act. Training CEOs and CPOs in
order that they may competently certify the report
requires a significant amount of time and effort.
Even if they are familiar with accounting control
procedures in such depth to make the certification
creclible, it will still require an inordinate amount
of time and effort to complete the work necessary
in order to certify the financial reports. One
question on the survey asked if the CEO/CPO
certification will be arduous and time-consuming
such that the costs will outweigh the benefits. A
univariate ANOVA was conducted by constituent
groups. The ANOVA was significant with
F.1. 301 (0.05) = 9.60, P < 0.001. Post-hoc analysis using
the Scheffe Test revealed significant mean
differences. Internal auditors, CPAs and accounting
educators all had higher mean scores than bankers.
Higher mean scores indicate disagreement with the
statement that the costs will outweigh the benefits.
The means and standard deviations for RQ5 are
presented in Table 3.
Responses to RQ5 reveal significant mean
differences between internal auditors, CPAs,
educators, and bankers. The means of the other
constituent groups are higher than that of bankers
which suggests that bankers are more in agreement
with the idea that the cost of the certification
requirement exceeds the benefits. 1he other
constituent groups appear to believe the benefits of
the certification requirement are worth the cost.
Once again, the results of this research question are
consistent with the previous results. As bankers do
not believe that the certification requirement adds
much value concerning credibility of the financial
statements or improvements in the internal
governance mechanisms of the corporation, it
stands to reason that the banking constituent group
would also feel that the cost of implementation
would necessarily exceed its benefit On the other
hand, it is also not surprising that internal auditors
would feel that the cost was justified. As discussed
previously, internal auditors gain a certain amount
of enforcement leverage with their employer
corporation that may have been absent prior to the
passage of the Act. As such, the benefits to them
far outweigh the costs of implementation. The
interesting results for this research question,

no vested interest in the cost. They are not paying
for it and they are not being paid for it At least
CPAs will reap the benefits of the increased costs
which somewhat explains their response.
Compliance costs related to the Act, especially in
the first year, can be staggering. Now CPAs
conduct an audit of the internal control system in
addition to the financial statement audit. Such
audits can create a whole new revenue stream for
CPAs that did not exist prior to the Act. Educators,
however, have no reason to believe that the cost
is justified unless they really do believe that the
certification requirement will improve the financial
reporting process. That result would be consistent
with the results of previous research questions in
this paper. Educators appear inclined to believe
that the certification requirement may help to calm
nervous investors and improve the corporation's
risk analysis procedures as well as to increase
credibility of the financial reports beyond what
was reqUired solely by the auditor before the
certification requirement existed. The results of
this research question are consistent with this
viewpoint for accounting educators.

Research question 6: Unable to kl10w
In addition to the time-consuming nature of the
work required for certification, there is some
question as to whether it is even possible for
executive officers to make this certification. This
question on the survey asked constituent groups if
CEOs and CPOs will be incapable of actually
knowing that there are no improprieties at some
distant operations. A univariate ANOVA was
conducted by constituent groups. The ANOVA was
not significant, with F.l, 303 (0.05) = 1.96, P < 0.099,
and post-hoc tests revealed no significant mean
differences between constituent groups. Lower
mean scores indicate agreement with the statement
in the survey instrument. The means and standard
deviations for RQ6 are presented in Table 3.
RQ6 relates to the demanding nature of the
certification requirement. Participants were asked
if the financial officers would even be capable of
knowing about control procedures in distant
operations. All of the constituent groups agreed
with lower mean scores. The results suggest
that the parties involved with the Act recognize
the inherent difficulties in the certification
requirement. Based on those requirements, it may
be impossible for the officers to do what is specified
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in the Act, even if they wanted to do it. It may be
that the demands of the Act are too unreasonable.
However, it is clearly apparent why the
certification requirement was placed in the Act All
too many times we have seen corporate executives

testify before Congress regarding areas of financial
impropriety. Many of those testimonies blame the
accountant. The CEO is just a figurehead with no
knowledge of accounting rules and principles. The
accountant should be held accountable for any
impropriety in the financial statements. Yet, that
defense is unacceptable. The massive cases of fraud
that have occurred could not have taken place in
the accounting department alone without the full
knowledge of the financial officers. Congress
wanted to force financial officers to take
responsibility for the information that was being
disseminated about the company. Consequently,
the certification requirement is a reactionary
and somewhat punitive measure. Participants
acknowledge that it may be impossible for financial
officers to actually know what the certification
requirement demands, but they want them to try
anyway. An executive that makes a good faith effort
to understand and evaluate his or her own financial
operations is far better than one who refuses to take
any responsibility at all. It seems that the market
participants are tired of the plaUSible deniability
excuse and now want a proactive executive that
takes his or her duty to the public very seriously.

Research question 7: Executive personal liability
The certification requirement makes the executive

officers personally liable for the information that is
reported. It is natural to assume that most executive

officers will not want to expose their personal assets
to the threat of shareholder lawsuits or federal
prosecution. As such, these officers will be
interested in developing methods to shield their
personal assets from exposure. To accomplish this,
Director's and Officer's (0&0) insurance had
commonly been used, but the industry had
observed increases in D&O insurance premiums

by as much as 500 percent in 2002 (Isdale, 2005)
and policy coverage was expected to be reduced.
Therefore, additional methods had also been
suggested, such as retitling assets, registering assets
in a more favorable state, or the use of an asset
protection trust (Isdale, 2005). Consequently, one
question in the survey asked constituent groups if
the certification will make executives personally
responsible for their company's financial statements

and will also create the desire for executives to
shield their personal assets from shareholder
lawsuits and federal prosecution. A univariate

ANOVA was conducted by constituent groups. The
ANOVA was significant with h 302 (0.05) = 4.67,
P < 0.001. Post-hoc analysis using the Scheffe Test
revealed significant mean differences. Educators
had higher mean scores than bankers or CFAs.
Higher scores indicate disagreement with the
sentiment that officers will attempt to shield their
personal assets. The means and standard deviations

are presented in Table 3 for RQ7.
RQ7 deals with a very pragmatic issue. Do tl1e
constituents believe that corporate executives
would try to shield their personal assets because
the certification requirement would make them
personally liable for the financial statements?
Would shielding personal assets become more
important than ensuring the financial statements
were as accurate as pOSSible? This research
question was responded to with educators having
Significantly higher mean scores than bankers or
CFAs. Once again, these results are consistent with
the results of the previous research question.
Educators have consistently demonstrated a belief
in the value of the certification requirement.
The results of this study show that educators may
believe that the certification requirement was
necessary to restore confidence in the financial
markets. Consequently, for this constituent group,
the benefits of the legislation outweighed its
cost While it was clear that educators, like the
other constituent groups, did not believe that this
provision would completely eliminate fraudulent
or materially misstated financial statements, they
do seem to conSistently view the provision in a
more optimistic light, in general, as opposed to the
banking constituent which consistently viewed the
certification requirement more negatively. A
summary of the results appears in Table 4.

CONCLUSIONS
nus study looks at one small piece of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the CEO/CFO
certification requirement. Five different constituent
groups were asked several questions regarding
the requirement. The degree of consensus among
the groups was used as a means to determine if the
requirement achieved its objective. The results
indicate that all five groups were skeptical about
the requirement's impact or ability to ensure
accurate financial statements. All five constituent
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Table 4: Summary of results by research question

RQl

The constituent groups will agree that the CEO/CFO certification
requirement gives investors a greater sense of comfort following the
Enran collapse.

RQ2

The constituent groups will agree that the CEO/CFO certification
requirement helps corporations become better at identifying risks and
controlling operations.

RQ3
RQ4

The constituent groups will agree that the CEO/CFO certification
requirement will ensure that no false or misleading financial statements
will be issued by corporations.
The constituent groups will agree that the CEO/CFO certification
requirement was unnecessary because the same statements are made to
the auditor in the management representation letter.

RQ5

The constituent groups will agree that the cost of the CEO/CFO
certification requirement will outweigh its benefits.

RQ6

The constituent groups will agree that the CEOs and CFOs cannot know
what is happening at all their operations, especially in large,

RQ7

The constituent groups will agree that the CEO/CFO certification

Significant differences
among groups
Significant differences
among groups

All disagreed
Significant differences
among groups

Significant differences
among groups
All agreed

multinational companies.
requirement will induce CEOs and CPOs to create new methods to

Significant differences
among groups

shield their personal assets from potential liability.

groups also agreed that it was unlikely the CEOs
and CFOs would have the necessary information
from distant operations to even make a
knowledgeable certification statement
There were significant differences, however, in
the other research questions. Bankers consistently
differed from the other constituent groups
concerning the purpose of the requirement, the
risk assessment process, the necessity of the
certification given the management representation
letter, the costs relative to the benefits of the
certification, and the personal liability issues of the
officers. Their results are consistently negative
across the research questions used in the study. It
appears the bankers, as a constituent group, have
little confidence in the certification requirement.
hl addition, educators also differ Significantly in
their responses to several of the research questions.
Their results are conSistently more positive than
some of the other constituent groups. lItis positive
outlook may stem from the nature of their
positions. Educators, in general, believe that people
and society can be changed by training. Laws and
regulations are a form of training where acceptable
behavior is defined and unacceptable behavior is
punished. As a result, it is not surprising that
educators would view tlle Sarbanes-Oxley act in a
more positive light
Some limitations and additional observations
also need to be mentioned. First of all, this study is

based on survey research, and although every
attempt was made during the execution and
evaluation of results to minimize the potential for
bias, such risk can never be totally eliminated.
Secondly, this study was conducted before the
current economic recession. It is possible, even
probable, that results may be different in the
current economic climate. It will be interesting to
see whether profeSSionals will still place value on
this certification, or if it will even continue to be
issued conSidering current court cases questioning
the legality of Sarbanes-Oxley requirements
('Sarbanes-Oxley on Trial', 2009). And finally, the
results concerning the banker constituent group
are interesting. They are conSistently more
pessimistic than other financial statement users. It
seems that creditors would be more pleased about
CEOs and CFOs taking responsibility for the
financial statements than appears in this study.
Additional research is warranted to determine the
specific cause of these results.
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